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Transaction Behavior in Nonmarket Settings: 
Revisiting Transaction Cost Economics Theory
JungWook Seo* and Seeun Ryu**
Abstract: This study focuses on changes in transaction costs over time in non-
market settings. Traditional Williamsonian transaction cost economics theory
shows little concern with time. However, this study reveals that time is a crucial
factor in the fluctuation of transaction costs in nonmarket settings: Transaction
costs increase in the initial and middle phases of a transaction. But in the long
term, they may increase or decrease and are affected considerably by whether
the rules, procedures, and protocols governing the transaction are effective
(“green tape”) or ineffective (“red tape”). In contrast, traditional transaction cost
economics assumes a gradual decrease in transaction costs over time. The
passage of time and the “red tape” or “green tape” governing the transaction
influence stakeholders’ transaction behavior in nonmarket settings.
Keywords: transaction costs, green tape, red tape, nonmarket settings, transaction
behavior
INTRODUCTION
Numerous actors and stakeholders are closely intertwined when they carry out
transactional behavior such as collaboration and cooperation in nonmarket settings.
The concept of network can be transferred to nonmarket settings (Camagni, 1993;
Capello, 2000; Chesnais, 1988). A network provides externalities of complementary
and vertical integration or from synergy and co-operation” among stakeholders
(Capello, 2000, p. 1926). Complementary relationships cause “synergic effects in co-
operative activities, achieved through participation in the network” (Capello, 2000,
p. 1927). These positive externalities reduce transaction costs.1 Sound network gover-
Manuscript received November 26, 2011; out for review February 6, 2012; review completed
March 19, 2012; accepted March 25, 2012.
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2012), pp. 23-40.
© 2012 by the GSPA, Seoul National University
** JungWook Seo is a researcher in the Institute of Public Affairs at Yonsei University. 
E-mail: gomsense@gmail.com.
** Seeun Ryu is a doctoral student in the School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University.
E-mail: deepearly38@gmail.com.
nance positively influences transaction behavior between internal and external stake-
holders (Clingermayer, 1997; Prager, 1994). Interconnection or networking among
internal and external interested parties is necessary for facilitating decision-making,
and it can contribute to reduced transaction costs in nonmarket settings.
This paper attempts to describe the relationship between transactional behavior and
transaction costs over time. It describes increases and decreases in transaction costs in
the short, medium, and long term. According to Williamson’s traditional theory, trans-
action costs are more likely to be reduced through institutionalizing processes. This
study is concerned with the change in transaction costs when stakeholders are involved
in a nonmarket setting. It extends the range of transaction costs theory to the nonmarket
setting2 and investigates its changes over time. In nonmarket settings—transactions,
collaborations, and cooperation between public institutions, or between public institu-
tions and nonprofit organizations—administrative rules, procedures, and protocols
might positively or negatively affect change in transaction costs in the long term. Based
on this assumption, this paper seeks to answer the following core questions:
1. Do stakeholders’ transaction behaviors affect the change in transaction costs
in nonmarket settings?
2. Over time, are there changes in transaction costs and transaction behaviors?
3. Which factors explain these changes?
Focusing on these questions, this paper employs an adjusted transaction costs
graph (Williamson, 1989), which applies to the economics concepts of fixed costs and
variable costs.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITIONS
Conceptualizing the Nonmarket Setting
Williamson’s traditional transaction cost economics (TCE) theory assumes a gradual
decrease in transaction costs. Many studies have verified this assumption in market
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1. Transaction costs are defined as “the costs of negotiating, enacting, and enforcing the
provisions of a contact or informal agreement and an external supplier of a service”
(Clingermayer, 1997, p. 231).
2. Initially, Williamson was concerned with market settings, and thus, his transaction costs
theory was developed through case studies of private firms (Williamson, 1975, 1981,
1985).
settings; their main research targets have been private corporations and companies.
This study suggests that transaction costs and transactions in nonmarket settings can
be different from those in market settings.
Profit and productivity are not the guiding principles when institutions carry out
transaction behaviors in nonmarket settings. Transactions in nonmarket settings are
different from those in market settings in that the former do not consider direct distribu-
tion of profit to stakeholders. Various transaction behaviors, including collaboration,
conflict, and cooperation among stakeholders, are related to the realization of the public
interest and social values or missions. In general, transactional behavior in nonmarket
settings is likely to occur (1) between public institutions and other public institutions
and (2) between public institutions and nonprofit organizations.
Administrative rules, regulations, protocols, and procedures can heavily influence
transactional behavior because public organizations play a crucial role in nonmarket
settings. On the other hand, reducing costs based on efficiency is a main purpose of
transactional behavior in market settings. In general, diverse collaborations, transactions,
and cooperation in nonmarket settings are concerned with political legitimization more
than with efficiency.
Transactions in Nonmarket Settings
Transactions or transaction behaviors are now an important issue in the field of
public administration. The World Bank (1991) defines governance as “the exercise of
political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s problems
and affairs.” S©™rensen and Torfing (2007) define governance networks as follows
(p. 9):
1. a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally
autonomous actors
2. who interact through negotiations
3. which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary
framework
4. that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies, and
5. which contributes to the production of public purpose
Transactions in nonmarket settings involve interactions between diverse actors who
are not viewed “as atomized and isolated, but as mutually interlinked” (Adam &
Kriesi, 2007, p. 146). In the nonmarket setting, interactions increase since stakeholders
require each other’s resources to attain their interests (Aldrich, 1979). There is self-
organized coordination among stakeholders, who negotiate and solve problems without
Transaction Behavior in Nonmarket Settings 25
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
government direction (Rhodes, 1997). How actors behave and interact in the nonmarket
setting determines the success of outcomes and alternation.
Increasing interactions, including information exchanges and regular communica-
tions, establish a stable pattern of relationships between actors (Kickert, Klijin, &
Koppenjan, 1997). In nonmarket settings, network management helps to initiate,
guide, facilitate, and stabilize interaction processes (Friend, Power, & Yewlett, 1974).
Network management promotes “the negotiation process through conflict mediation,
process planning, and diplomacy” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 24). Dean (1999) argues that net-
work management builds partnerships, hearings, negotiations, user boards, free choice,
and participation incentives. It contributes to building a set of norms, standards,
benchmarks, procedures, protocols, and control mechanisms. This study is concerned
with relationships among various stakeholders in nonmarket settings.
Transaction Costs
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory draws attention to efficiency in transac-
tions among stakeholders.3 There are many definitions of transaction cost. Demsetz
(1968) defines it narrowly: “transaction cost may be defined as the cost of exchanging
ownership titles” (p. 35). Coase (1960) refers to “the cost of using the price mecha-
nism” and “the costs of carrying out market transactions” between firms or between
individuals and firms “to inform people that one wished to deal and on what terms, to
conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the
inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed and
so on” (p. 7). Wallis and North (1986) define it as “all costs borne by the consumer
that are not transferred to the seller of the good” (p. 98). Investment costs in financial
markets, such as brokerage fees and ask-bid spreads, are generally regarded as transac-
tion costs in financial economics (Bhardwaj & Brooks, 1992; Demsetz, 1968; Stoll
and Shaley, 1983; Wang, 2003). Dyer (1997) presents four types of transaction costs
(p. 536): search costs, contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs.
McCann, Colby, Easter, Kasterine, and Kuperan (2005) extend the range of transaction
costs to the public policy area. Transaction costs include (McCann et al., 2005, p. 533):
1. research, information gathering, and analysis associated with defining the
problem
2. enactment of enabling legislation, the cost of changing laws
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3. In contrast, many traditional economic models and theories stress internal efficiency in
producing goods and services.
3. design and implementation of the policy
4. support and administration of the ongoing program
5. contracting costs, including additional information costs, bargaining costs,
decision costs, tax/subsidy scheme, or private contract, as well as the develop-
ment of monitoring technologies
6. prosecution/inducement/conflict resolution costs incurred if lack of compli-
ance is found
There is a wide spectrum of ways to reify or operationalize transaction costs,
including the following:
1. a direct measurement of transaction costs—resources used for locating stake-
holders and implementing transaction behaviors (Benham & Benham, 1998;
Colby, 1990; de Soto, 1989)
2. the difference between the price paid by the buyer and that received by the
seller (Bhardwaj & Brooks, 1992; Demsetz, 1968; Stoll & Shaley, 1983;
Wang, 2003, p. 2)
3. secondary transaction costs—that is, the cost for negotiation and enforcement
(Wang, 2003; Williamson, 1985, 1989, 1991)
This study defines transaction costs broadly as all the resources that are required
for transaction behavior among internal and external stakeholders. Transaction costs
include tangible and intangible resources—such as knowledge, information, money,
and human resources—that are related to transaction behavior. In addition, they include
resources for carrying out indirect transactions such as negotiation, monitoring,
administrative support, and enforcement.
The Williamsonian TCE graph (figure 1) determines the governance structure
between an internal organization (firm) and market when researchers know the level
of asset specificity for a transaction, the frequency of interactions among stakeholders,
and the degree of uncertainty (Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
∆G stands for the differences between “the bureaucratic costs of internal governance—
B(k) and the corresponding governance costs of markets—M(k), where k is an index
of asset specificity” (Williamson, 1989, p. 151). If ?G is more than zero, an internal
organization would be preferred; if ∆G is less than zero, the market type of governance
structure is favored.
Williamson’s traditional curve mainly focuses on predicting the governance struc-
ture that adopts the transaction with the related parties and minimizes its costs. His
approach shows little concern about the differences in transaction costs in different
time horizons—short- and long-term transactions between internal and external stake-
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holders (Dyer, 1997). A few studies have focused on transaction costs and transaction
behavior in nonmarket settings (e.g., de Soto, 1989; Kang, 2005; Kim, 2005; Kim &
Song, 2002). For example, de Soto (1989) presents and measures nonmarket transaction
costs. He operationalizes transaction costs as waiting time, bribes for public servants,
and resources wasted by organizational red tape during transaction behavior. However,
these studies, too, have paid little attention to the effect of time on changes in transaction
costs.
This study explores the change in transaction costs over time, and presents the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 1. Transaction costs in nonmarket settings are likely to fluctuate
over different time horizons.
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Figure 1. Traditional Curve of Williamson’s Transaction Costs
Source: Williamson, 1989, p. 159.
Transaction Costs, Organizational Rules, and Time
Rules, regulations, processes, procedures, and protocols considerably influence orga-
nizational structure, behavior, and performance. Organizational rules, regulations, and
procedures affect the efficiency and effectiveness of transaction behavior. Traditionally,
many theorists and experts also have paid attention to a negative aspect of organizational
rules, procedures, and regulations—red tape or ineffective rules (DeHart-Davis, 2009a,
2009b). Red tape has been considered an obstacle to organizational efficiency and effec-
tiveness in both the public and private domain. Bozeman (2000) argues that red tape has
a negative effect on public organizations, since it wastes resources and detracts from the
achievement of legitimate objectives. Common characteristics of red tape include the
following:
1. high formalization and constraint (Hall, 1968)
2. excessive or unnecessary paperwork (Bennett & Johnson, 1979)
3. unnecessary rules, procedures, and regulations
4. inefficiency (Bozeman, 1993)
5. unjustifiable delays (Bozeman, Reed, & Scott, 1992)
However, some scholars point out that there are also beneficial aspects of rules,
regulations, and procedures in organizational behavior and performance (Benveniste,
1987; Bozeman, 1993, 2000; DeHart-Davis, 2009a, 2009b; Goodsell, 2000). Organi-
zational rules sometimes confer benefits in the form of procedural safeguards that
guarantee accountability, predictability, and fairness in administrative and policy deci-
sions (Bozeman, 1993, 2000). Landau (1969) says that duplication and overlapping of
procedures or tasks can provide important benefits. Employees in public and private
organizations are likely to face uncertainty or ambiguity without appropriate rules,
procedures, and regulations. Effective rules, or “green tape,”4 are regarded as a normal
part of bureaucracy. DeHart-Davis (2009b) argues that bureaucratic green tape could
boost public employees’ rule abidance as stakeholders.
Some scholars focus on the relationship between ineffective bureaucracy (red tape)
and changes in the costs of transactional behavior (de Soto, 1989; Falconer & Saunders,
2002). They state that cutting red tape has a positive effect on reducing transaction
costs in both market and nonmarket settings. However, scholars pay little attention to
changes in transaction costs from green tape or effective rules and normal bureaucratic
behavior. The negative effects of red tape or ineffective rules are closely associated
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4. These are labeled “green tape to contrast with red tape” (DeHart-Davis, 2009a, p. 362).
with inefficiency, excessive regulations, and frustrations in a bureaucracy; the benefits
of effective rules or green tape mainly come from redundancy, accountability, and rule
abidance. In the governance set-up process, the initial phase of a transaction, rules,
protocols, and procedures influence the change in transaction costs. Such a rule-setting
process results in an increase in transaction costs. The application of effective or
ineffective rules considerably affects transaction costs or transaction behavior in the
long term. This study uses the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Rule maturity (the perception of rules over time) is likely to
influence the change in transaction costs.
Once established, rules, procedures, and protocols supporting transactions are diffi-
cult to change even though they may lead to inefficiency in transaction processes
(Burger, 1981; Skocpol et al., 1985). Such rules are characterized by path dependence,
and can affect ongoing transactions. This study is concerned with the relationship
between good and bad organizational rules (red and green tape) and the change in
transaction costs in nonmarket settings. Organizational members’ perceptions of
organizational rules, procedures, and protocols is a critical standard for determining
whether an organization has red tape or not. The perception is formed “by humans in
repetitive situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 23).
It has been mutually constructed in parties’ minds over time rather than right after the
forming of rules, procedures, and protocols. Thus it is possible to consider the effect
of red tape or green tape on transaction costs in the long term. This study makes the
following propositions:
Proposition 3. Red tape or ineffective rules are likely to negatively influence
transactional behavior and transaction costs in the long term.
Proposition 4. Green tape or effective rules are more likely to reduce transac-
tion costs in the long term.
TRANSACTION COSTS OVER TIME
Bounded rational individuals experience conflict, mutuality, and order (Commons,
1932). Even though many researchers have discussed transaction costs in the creation
of organizations (Moe, 1984; Williamson, 1979, 1999), transaction costs theory is also
applicable to transaction behavior, including collaboration, conflict, and coordination,
in nonmarket settings. Based on the assumptions of TCE, the parties in the transaction
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behavior are economic groups (actors) who “have the capacity to look ahead, recognize
potential hazards, and factor these into the transactions” (Williamson, 1999, p. 311).
Bounded rational actors could calculate intuitively and reasonably the difference
between “benefits/costs of autonomy and cooperation” (Williamson, 1999, p. 312) and
decide whether to remain independent or to cooperate with each other. Stakeholders
and parties such as citizens, nonprofit organizations, governments, business, and councils
are involved in the transaction process in nonmarket settings.
Transaction Costs in the Initial and Middle Stages
In the nonmarket setting, initial interconnections or transactions between stake-
holders are increasing since stakeholders have to set up the institution including its
norms, procedures, rules, protocols, and regulations (Egdell, 1998; McCann et al.,
2005; Williamson, 1979). Dyer (1997) calls these costs “governance set-up costs”
(p. 537). Stakeholders set “humanly devised constraints” that organize interactions and
transactions (North, 1992, p.?4). They create “formal rules (statute law, common law,
regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self-imposed
rules of behavior), and the enforcement characteristics of both” (North, 1992, p. 4).
Regardless of the form of transaction, most transactional behavior among stake-
holders has direct and secondary costs. Transaction costs are involved in building net-
work structures, including the costs of identifying and evaluating parties and negotiating
and writing contracts. Fang and colleagues (2005) demonstrate that about 65 percent
of transaction costs are incurred before any transaction takes place. However, the costs
do not increase linearly in proportion to the degree of a transaction. The slope of a
transaction costs curve is likely to be gentle from initial phase to middle phase, as
shown in figure 2.
The transaction costs, including time and money, involved in becoming personally
acquainted and creating collaboration and cooperation with stakeholders, increase
before transactions are regularized and stabilized. Transactions including communication
and frequent exchange of information between actors eventually become regularized
and stable. The actors coordinate their mutual interests as interactions increase (Adam
& Kriesi, 2007). Institutionalized rules and procedures help people know how to interact
and work together. Thus even added transactions between multiple actors at multiple
levels do not cost at the same ratio. The marginal cost for transactions gradually
diminishes after rules and procedures are institutionalized (see figure 2).
There are two kinds of transaction costs: fixed and variable over time. In the
processes of collaboration, conflict, and coordination in nonmarket settings, fixed
transaction costs are for supporting and managing transaction behaviors (McCann &
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Easter, 1999, 2000). In the initial and middle stages, fixed transaction costs hardly
change, as presented in figure 3. Variable transaction costs are associated with the
changes in proportion to the exchange in the nonmarket setting over time (Falconer &
Saunders, 2002). In general, variable transaction costs for smoothing stakeholders’
interactions increase during the setting process (initial stage). The setting costs include
the efforts to establish rules, protocols, regulations, and procedures to manage and
support transactional behavior. Variable transaction costs are affected by situational
factors such as development of monitoring and abatement technologies, changes in
political environment, and economic fortunes. Situational factors can lead to a
decrease in transaction costs (McCann, 2005) as time passes (see figure 3).
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Figure 2. Transaction Costs in the Initial and Middle Phases
Transaction Costs in the Long Term
The change in transaction costs in the long term is different from the change during
the initial and middle stages. Nonmarket transaction costs can either decrease or
increase in the long term, while they are more likely to increase in the initial stage of
governance set-up. This section presents two scenarios for change in transaction costs:
decrease and increase.
This study assumes that effective and ineffective rules for managing and support-
ing relations between parties significantly affect transaction costs in the long term. In
nonmarket settings, transaction costs increase when parties consider rules to be bur-
densome or unnecessary, and decrease when parties consider rules to be helpful and
beneficial to their transactional behavior.
Decrease in Transaction Costs
Institutionalized networking or interaction processes are likely to accompany
costs—that is, these costs are regarded as fixed in the long term. Stakeholders can
reduce the trials and errors of the contracting process when formalized and well-written
protocols, rules, or procedures are applied to the interactions in nonmarket settings.
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Figure 3.  Fixed and Variable Transaction Costs
The application of well-written rules grants strong legitimacy to transaction behaviors
between stakeholders (Ford & Johnson, 1998). The legitimacy of the application of
formalized and well-written rules can improve rule compliance and cooperation
among stakeholders (Barnard, 1938; DeHart-Davis, 2009a, 2009b).
“Optimally controlling rules or green tape” (DeHart-Davis, 2009a, 2009b) provide
stakeholders with flexibility in interactions and interrelations. Good rules impose
“what [is] perceived as just the right amount of control” (DeHart-Davis, 2009a, p. 368).
It is not easy for stakeholders to carry out appropriate transactional behavior for reaching
an agreement when an organizational structure is very bureaucratic—that is, when an
organization has complicated and fixed organizational rules, procedures, and protocols
for interactions and networking with outside stakeholders. Flexible rules, protocols, or
procedures would encourage stakeholders to reach an agreement for cooperation,
because flexibility allows stakeholders to consider various alternatives during their
transactional behaviors.
Stakeholders’ understanding of rules, procedures, and protocols for administering
transactions makes it easy to reach a consensus. Rules are likely to be red tape unless
stakeholders do not understand their purpose (Bozeman, 2000; DeHart-Davis, 2009b).
Well-understood rules can reduce conflicts among stakeholders in the long term.
Consistent and fair application of rules for networking and transactions can pro-
mote the participation of outside stakeholders including individuals, corporations, and
nonprofit organizations over time. Fair rules, procedures, and protocols are thought to
reduce uncertainty in the interactions between parties (DeCremer & Tyler, 2005).
Decrease in uncertainty and increase in participation in transactions are likely to induce
sound competition among outside stakeholders. Such competition will contribute to
parties reducing costs in the long term. Figure 4 reveals the decrease in transaction
costs under the application of effective rules (green tape) over time.5
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5. In long-term situations, it is not necessary to consider changes in fixed costs and governance
set-up costs. These costs naturally decrease as time goes by, and their burden might be
distributed over a long time frame.
Increase in Transaction Costs
This study suggests that rule (in)effectiveness has positive or negative effects on
transaction costs and stakeholders’ transaction behavior.6 This section discusses the
relationship, over the long term, between the application of ineffective rules, proce-
dures, and protocols (red tape) and changes in transaction costs in nonmarket settings.
Ineffective rules, procedures, and protocols (red tape) are associated with lack of
trust between stakeholders (Gouldner, 1952). This lack of trust has negative effects on
transactional behavior over time. Ineffective rules are likely to decrease the effectiveness
of transactional behavior in nonmarket settings in that they hinder trust building between
stakeholders. According to Dyer (1997), “information sharing, commitment to future
interaction (networking), and self-enforcing safeguards (norms, rules, protocols) to
govern the relationship” (550-551) have a positive causal relationship with trust-building
in the administrative process or transactional behavior. Increase in trustworthiness
within the exchange behavior contributes to reducing transaction costs (Dyer, 1997;
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6. Studies have pointed out that “self-interest seeking with guile” is a major reason that costs
increase in transactional behavior (Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1985).
Figure 4.  Transaction Costs and Application of Effective Rules
Ulrich & Barney, 1984). De Soto (1989) asserts that decrease in ineffective organiza-
tional rules (cutting red tape) in transactional behavior reduces transaction costs in the
nonmarket setting. Ineffective rules are likely to increase transaction costs among
internal and external stakeholders. Figure 5 shows the change in transaction costs from
the application of ineffective rules over the long term.
CONCLUSION
This study presents propositions about the relationship between time and transac-
tion costs in transaction behavior in nonmarket settings. It addresses the change in
transaction costs over time—during the initial, mid-term, and long-term periods. In the
early to middle stages, core participants in nonmarket settings, including government
and related stakeholders, seek to form network governance to promote transaction
behavior (such as collaboration and cooperation). Parties are building relationships,
gathering information, and forming various safeguards to facilitate the processes of
transactional behavior. These activities accompany an increase in fixed and variable
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Figure 5.  Ineffective Rules and Transaction Costs over the Long Term
transaction costs. The increase occurs mainly in the initial stage of transactions. Like
sunk costs, fixed transaction costs hardly change over time; in contrast, variable trans-
action costs are likely to decrease from the initial stage to the middle stage.
This study addresses situations in which transaction costs decrease or increase in
the long term. It suggests that effective or ineffective rules (red tape or green tape) for
supporting and managing transactional behavior between stakeholders can affect this
change in transaction costs. Rules are thought to be effective if they are (1) formalized
and well written, (2) flexible (optimally controlling), (3) fair and consistent, and (4)
understandable (DeHart-Davis, 2009a, 2009b). Effective rules are expected to reduce
transaction costs in the long term, while ineffective rules can increase costs. Rules are
regarded as ineffective when stakeholders perceive them as unnecessary or burden-
some. Such rules hinder trust building when stakeholders engage in transactional
behavior.
This study reveals the importance of time on TCE. Many studies in public adminis-
tration and policy hardly consider the relationship between time and changes in trans-
action costs. Theoretical studies mainly focus on how to conceptualize transaction
behavior and transaction costs and how to measure transaction costs. Many empirical
studies based on traditional TCE theory have emphasized measuring transaction costs
at a given time.
Experts in public administration and policy have to consider nonmarket transaction
costs when they study transaction costs and transaction behavior in the public and
nonprofit sectors. This study expands de Soto’s (1989) concept of nonmarket transaction
costs to nonmarket settings. Hernando de Soto (1989) the importance of resources
spent on “waiting, getting permits to do business, cutting through red tape, and bribing
officials” (de Soto, 1989; Wang, 2003, p. 6) during transaction behavior. This study
suggests that such nonmarket transaction costs are likely to occur in nonmarket settings—
transactions between different public institutions or between public institutions and
nonprofit organizations—because it is difficult for public institutions to ignore political
legitimization in their transactional behavior.
This is a preliminary study that examines theoretical assumptions. Additional
research is needed to examine empirical cases to test the propositions presented here,
develop quantifiable measures for more precise prediction of the change in transaction
costs, and develop appropriate tools for reifying the power of network governance,
collaborations, and cooperation between government officials and outside stakeholders
in transactional behavior in nonmarket settings.
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